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Introduction
In 1958, the New York Convention was introduced by
24 signatories, superseding the previous international
instruments and ushering in a new era of transnational
commercial arbitration.1 The Convention on the
Recognition and Enforcement of ForeignArbitral Awards,
also referred to as the NewYork Convention (NYC), was
created to encourage the settlement of international
disputes through arbitration.2 It has been characterised as
“one of the boldest attempts to enhance… arbitration and
to achieve unification in state practice …”.3 This is
buttressed by the fact that courts are perceived as having
a pre-bias against hearing arbitration appeals.4Ultimately,
this is rooted in the objectives of the NYC and the courts’
respect for the contractual autonomy of the parties; thus
courts exercise their discretion when faced with arbitral
appeal.5 Party autonomy represents the autonomous will
of the parties to a contract.6 However, the mere fact that
parties contracted to go to arbitration can then appeal
their award in national courts, demonstrates the extent to
which arbitration is undeveloped as an independent,
alternative dispute resolution mechanism. It is not
surprising, therefore, that scholars have voiced concern
over continued judicial intervention in arbitration under
the umbrella of delocalisation theory. Thus, delocalisation
supports the premise that arbitration should be wholly
independent. However, without an appeal arbitral body,
it would be difficult to give practical significance to this
theoretical view. This raises the question of whether a
diluted version of delocalisation, where court intervention
is limited by the presence of an arbitral appeal body, is
possible, and, if so, which form should it take? As a
solution, we consider the possibility of creating an
international appeal bodymodelled upon the international
Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID)
Additional Facility, which provides for appeal in
international investment disputes.
Against that background, the aim of this article is
twofold. First, it will explore the development of the
delocalisation theory with particular emphasis on the
theoretical debate for and against continued court
intervention. The aim is to find justification for
delocalisation by limiting court intervention in arbitration.
Secondly, it will explore the scope for reform through
the institution of an appeal body. The aim is to consider
implementing an international commercial arbitral body
to complement ICSID Additional Facility. Last but not
least, a circumspect conclusion will be reached in regards
to the direction of future legal development in this area.
Party autonomy and delocalisation
theory
Party autonomy has its foundations in the freedom of
parties to determine the conduct of the arbitral process
and in the parties’ selection of substantive law.
Consequently, they choose all aspects of the arbitration
which includes the seat of arbitration, the choice of law,
the appointment of arbitrators and the language of the
arbitration, among others.7 With regard to the choice of
substantive law, the principle refers to the rule that the
arbitral tribunal shall apply the law chosen by the parties
as relevant to the substance of the dispute.8 Party
autonomy in contracts, through which parties assign a
particular law to govern their disputes, developed
alongside the principle of state sovereignty. It was first
put forward by the French jurist Charles Dumoulin
(1500–66), who is regarded as the founding father of
party autonomy.9 Dumoulin expressed that party
autonomy was the primary factor governing the law of
contract. Thus, intention is a key determinant of the law
or body to govern a particular contract.10 Furthermore, he
observed that in the absence of express selection of law
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Delocalisation in International Commercial Arbitration: A Theory in Need of Practical Application 269
[2016] I.C.C.L.R., Issue 8 © 2016 Thomson Reuters (Professional) UK Limited and Contributors
by the parties, the law to govern the contract must be
sought in agreement with the parties’ inferred and likely
intentions.11
Party autonomy is endorsed by the NYC art.V(1)(d).12
An award may be declined recognition
“if the procedure was not in accordance with the
agreement of the parties, or, failing such agreement,
was not in accordance with the law of the country
where the arbitration took place”.13
In addition, art.19(1) of the United Nations Commission
on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) Model Law
states that “subject to the provisions of this Law, the
parties are free to agree on the procedure to be followed
by the arbitral tribunal in conducting the proceedings”.14
However, the power of the parties to act as the
orchestrators of the arbitral proceedings is not absolute,
indicating that party autonomy is limited.15Consequently,
opposition to the unwarranted judicial intervention in
arbitration resulted in the development of the
delocalisation theory.16 As such, the discussion will now
turn to the theory of delocalisation, the development of
which is a result of hostility to the unwarranted
interference with party autonomy to arbitrate.17
Delocalisation is a modern development, and while
difficulty arises in defining it, the concept is nevertheless
regarded as a theoretical shield for the arbitral process.18
According to Pryles, delocalisation is a security blanket,
enabling the arbitral process to be independent of the
national legal system at the seat of arbitration.19 Weiner,
however, argues that it is a concept simply associated
with established rules, which are customary to
transnational commercial matters.20 Nonetheless, the
interpretation advocated by Pryles is widely favoured,
with party autonomy being the core fabric of the arbitral
process. It is this doctrine which provides the basic
features of the concept of delocalisation and which is
defined as “the ‘unfettered’ rights of parties to determine
how their dispute may be resolved”.21 Accordingly,
delocalisation has been endorsed as it facilitates the core
features of arbitration, namely the process being private
and confidential, which the theory aims to uphold by
protecting arbitration from external intrusion.
Arguments for delocalisation
The importance of delocalised arbitration is established
upon certain distinct arguments. The first is the parties’
autonomy to arbitrate. Their choice to select arbitration
rather than being subject to national laws is an imperative
feature which is respected by contemporary legislation,
such as the UNCITRAL Model Law.22 On this basis,
delocalisation views the arbitral procedure and any award
as originating autonomously and independently of the
national legal systems.23 Furthermore, the arbitral
agreement is central to the arbitral process from which
the right to arbitrate arises rather than from lex loci arbitri,
the law of the seat.24 Thus, arbitral awards granted as a
result of arbitration are recognised by national courts,
averting national court intervention, as provided by the
doctrines of arbitral finality and res judicata.25
Secondly, the arbitral process is “self-regulating”,
which enables parties to abide by certain procedural rules
selected by themselves as a result of ad hoc arbitration
or supplied under institutional arbitration.26Delocalisation
provides for disputes to be resolved through mutual
understanding and co-operation between the parties and
arbitral tribunals.27 Thus, judicial intervention is not
required as parties agree to resolve disputes in a manner
compliant with arbitration; in theory, delocalisation is a
concept which has practical workability in international
arbitration. Given the above support for delocalisation,
it can be correctly stated that, as arbitration is a private
matter—onewhich the parties have autonomously agreed
to embark upon to resolve their disputes—judicial
intervention is unwarranted.
Thirdly, supporters of delocalised arbitration espouse
the view that arbitration should be observed as
supra-national and that national laws should have no
power over the arbitral process.28 Essentially, this appears
to be justifiable as arbitration is conducted in private.
Thus, marrying delocalisation with court oversight is
wholly contradictory because intervention by national
courts is contrary to the core principles of arbitration.
Despite that, judicial interference remains the leading
factor that endangers delocalisation. Judicial review from
the situs is regarded as being a fait accompli and a
11M. Zhang, “Party Autonomy and Beyond: An International Perspective of Contractual Choice of Law” (2006) 20 Emory International Law Review 511.
12NYC art.V(1)(d).
13NYC art.V(1)(d).
14UNCITRAL Model Law art.1.
15O.S. Perepelynska, “Party Autonomy vs. Mandatory Rules in International Arbitration” [2012] Ukrainian Journal of Business Law 38.
16R. Goode, “The Role of the Lex Loci Arbitri in International Commercial Arbitration” (2001) 17 Arbitration International 1, 21.
17Goode, “The Role of the Lex Loci Arbitri in International Commercial Arbitration” (2001) 17 Arbitration International 1, 21.
18O. Dike, “Delocalisation of Ad Hoc Arbitral Proceedings: To What Extent Can the Jurisdiction of the Court of the Seat of Arbitration be Excluded?” [2008] C.A.R. 1.
19M. Pryles, “Limits to Party Autonomy in Arbitral Procedure” [2008] International Council for Commercial Arbitration 1, 6.
20 Jarrod Wiener, “The ‘Transnational’ Political Economy: A Framework for Analysis” [1996] SiSU 1, 5 (online). Available at: http://www.jus.uio.no/lm/the.transnational
.political.economy.a.framework.for.analysis.jarrod.wiener.ukc/landscape.a4.pdf [Accessed 30 May 2016].
21Alan Redfern, M. Hunter et al., Law and Practice of International Commercial Arbitration, 4th edn (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2004), p.11.
22UNCITRAL Model Law on Commercial Arbitration 1985 (with amendments as adopted in 2006).
23Goode, “The Role of the Lex Loci Arbitri in Interbational Commercial Arbitration” (2001) 17 Arbitration International 1, 21.
24Matthew Secomb, “Shades of Delocalisation Diversity in the Adoption of the UNCITRAL Model Law in Australia, Hong Kong and Singapore” (2000) 17 Journal of
International Arbitration 123, 128.
25 P. Read, “Delocalization of International Commercial Arbitration: Its Relevance in the New Millennium” (1999) 10 American Review of International Arbitration 177.
SeeWalkinshaw v Diniz [2000] 2 All E.R (Comm) 237 QBD; andMinmetals Germany GmbH v Ferco Steel Ltd [1999] 1 All E.R. (Comm) 315; [1999] C.L.C 647;Times,
1 March 1999 QBD.
26 Jie Li, “The Application of the Delocalisation Theory in Current International Commercial Arbitration” [2011] I.C.C.L.R. 1, 3.
27 Fali S. Nariman, “The Spirit of Arbitration: The Tenth Annual Goff Lecture” (2000) 16 Arbitration International 261.
28Li, “The Application of the Delocalisation Theory in Current International Commercial Arbitration” [2011] I.C.C.L.R 1, 6.
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consequence of intervention by national courts. It is also
regarded as an unruly source imposing upon the
practicability of the NYC.29
Furthermore, the NYC supports delocalised arbitration.
Article V(1)(e) is often cited by advocates of
delocalisation. For instance, Goode expresses that
art.V(1)(e) grants enforcing states the authority to enforce
annulled awards notwithstanding their invalidation.30
Despite this, critics of delocalisation argue that the
aforementioned article actually endorses judicial
interference in the arbitral process. As such, this portrays
delocalisation as merely theoretical as states are
empowered with the ability to ignore or suspend invalid
arbitral awards. Thus, it is this judicial intervention which
undermines delocalisation. However, over time, scholars
and practitioners have come to recognise the notion of
the non-controlling function of the state. The role of the
national courts is now viewed as supportive of the arbitral
process, rather than controlling it.31
Arguments against delocalisation
While delocalised arbitration is an ideal concept, it is
regarded as a far-fetched reality.32 Hostility towards it is
to an extent a universal phenomenon.33 Critics of
delocalisation classify it as “wholly unrealistic”,34 arguing
that it endeavours to place arbitration in a “legal
vacuum”.35 Redfern and Hunter regard delocalisation as
deceptive.36 They propose that the arbitral procedure
should instead be regulated by the laws of the seat of
arbitration and by the laws of the enforcing state. Mann
states that delocalisation is impractical as
“every arbitration is necessarily subject to the law
of a given state … Every right … a private person
enjoys is inexorably … derived from a system of
municipal lawwhichmay conveniently… be called
lex fori …”.37
While this statement is reasonable, delocalisation is not
motivated by the attempt to evade the constraints of
national jurisdictions. Rather, municipal law may not be
required to impose limits on arbitration, thus enabling the
arbitral process to be liberated by the restrictions of lex
loci arbitri.38 Thus, opposition to delocalised arbitration
is rooted in the argument that it is vital for arbitration to
have a seat and to be entrenched in the national law at
the seat.39
Furthermore, it is necessary for judicial review to be
maintained in order to safeguard justice and provide
checks and balances by monitoring “the quality of
decisions benefiting from the treaty scheme”.40 The
integrity of the arbitral process is reflected in the
relationship between41 the UNIDROIT, Principles of
International Commercial Contracts42 and the courts.
UNIDROIT consists of a variety of rules which are
utilised to resolve international contractual disputes. These
soft law rules have been drafted with party autonomy in
mind so that individuals have full confidence in the
institution and the rules used to regulate the arbitral
process. Therefore, procedural justice is a key component
of the arbitral rules and is recognised by international
arbitral institutions.43 Thus, court intervention in
arbitration conflicts with these recognised rules of
international law. However, judicial intervention indicates
that arbitration is not a mechanism deemed efficient and
trustworthy. Thus, while delocalisation is a supportive
and encouraging theory, in practice, it may in fact create
many injustices.44 On that ground, further court
involvement in protecting national commercial or
jurisdictional interests is justifiable.45
Consequently, to have a process that is almost
completely separate from national laws without any court
intervention could damage the practicality of arbitration.
Therefore, there must be a balance between party
autonomy and contract law jurisprudence. Article 11(4)
of the UNCITRAL Model Law recognises the pivotal
function of the courts to ensure that the arbitral process
does not end in stalemate.46 Judicial intervention may be
required in circumstances where certain issues arise prior,
throughout or following the arbitral procedure. As such,
it is vital to observe the instances where judicial
interference may be necessitated. For instance, a party
may challenge the agreement to arbitrate by commencing
29Li, “The Application of the Delocalisation Theory in Current International Commercial Arbitration” [2011] I.C.C.L.R 1, 6.
30Goode, “The Role of the Lex Loci Arbitri in Interbational Commercial Arbitration” (2001) 17 Arbitration International 1, 23.
31Channel Tunnel Group Ltd v Balfour Beatty Construction Ltd [1993] A.C. 334; [1993] 1 All E.R. 664; [1993] I.L.Pr. 607 HL; and Eagle Star Insurance Co Ltd v Yuval
Insurance Co [1978] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 357 CA (Civ Div). See also K. Hafez, “The General Principles of Law Applicable to International Disputes” (1998) 64 Arbitration
London 12.
32W. Park, “The Lex Loci Arbitri and International Commercial Arbitration” (1983) 32 International & Comparative Law Quarterly 21; and J. Mustill, “The New Lex
Mercantoria: The First Twenty-Five Years” (1988) 4 Arbitration International 86.
33 F. Mann, “England Rejects ‘Delocalized’ Contracts and Arbitration” (1983) 33 International & Comparative Law Quarterly 193; L. Collins, “The Law Governing the
Agreement and Procedure in International Arbitration in England” [1986]Contemporary Problems in International Arbitration 126; andM. Rubino-Sammartano, International
Arbitration Law and Practice (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2001).
34Andrew Tweeddale and Keren Tweeddale, Arbitration of Commercial Disputes International and English Law and Practice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007).
35Li, “The Application of the Delocalisation Theory in Current International Commercial Arbitration” [2011] I.C.C.L.R. 1, 4.
36N. Blackaby and C. Partasides, with A. Redfern and M. Hunter, Redfern and Hunter on International Arbitration, 6th edn (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2015), p.187.
37 F.A. Mann, “Lex Facit Arbitrum” in P. Sanders (ed.), International Arbitration: Liber Amicorum for Martin Domke (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1967), p.157.
38Li, “The Application of the Delocalisation Theory in Current International Commercial Arbitration” [2011] I.C.C.L.R. 1, 4.
39D. Janicijevie, “Delocalization in International Commercial Arbitration” (2005) 31 Law and Politics 63, 65.
40William W. Park, Arbitration of International Business Disputes: Studies in Law and Practice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), p.149.
41Klaus P. Berger, Private Dispute Resolution in International Business: Negotiation, Mediation and Arbitration (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2006).
42UNIDROIT, Principles of International Commercial Contracts (2010).
43Berger, Private Dispute Resolution in International Business (2006).
44Secomb, “Shades of Delocalisation Diversity in the Adoption of the UNCITRALModel Law in Australia, Hong Kong and Singapore” (2000) 17 Journal of International
Arbitration 123, 129.
45 J.D.M. Lew, “Does National Court Involvement Undermine the International Arbitration Process?” (2009) 24 American University International Law Review 489, 494.
46UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration 1985, with amendments as adopted in 2006, s.11(4).
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litigation, prior to the creation of the tribunal.47 As such,
the courts will be enlisted to determine whether there was
indeed an arbitral agreement and to establish its
enforceability.48 Likewise, in the event that the respondent
declines to assign an arbitrator or where the parties are
unsuccessful in consenting to sole arbitration and there
is no existence of applicable rules, assistance from
national courts can be sought to select arbitrators.49
Furthermore, where there is confusion regarding the
arbitral clause, parties can apply to the court to provide
clarification on a certain point, as evidenced inDalimpex
Ltd v Janicki.50 The parties had chosen an arbitral
institution that had ceased to exist when the dispute
occurred. One party sought clarification from the court
to ascertain whether the clause could be construed to
permit the dispute to be heard by the successor-body of
the original institution. The court held this was acceptable,
and thus the parties commenced the arbitral procedure.
This highlights one of the many instances in which
assistance from national courts “saved” the arbitral
process, thus demonstrating the usefulness of judicial
interference. Similar cases such asNational Iran Oil Co51
and Cangene Corp52 illustrate the unrealistic practicality
of delocalisation. In National Iran Oil Co, the court
required the selection of an arbitrator to ensure that justice
was granted even though France’s statutory requirements
for arbitration were not satisfied.53 Likewise, in Cangene
Corp, a dispute arose between parties with regard to the
arbitral agreement and the court found the agreement
valid, thus directing the parties to constitute the arbitral
tribunal.
Judicial intervention is also vital in circumstances
where the arbitral tribunal requires the taking of interim
measures.While the tribunal is possessed with this ability,
if it has not been assigned to do so, where it does not have
authority or in cases where the interim measures concern
third parties, judicial intervention may be essential.54
Preliminary measures may further be necessitated to
ensure that evidence is safeguarded or to defend particular
entitlements afforded to parties. This must take place
before the tribunal assumes power. In the absence of this,
the commercial welfare of the parties may be damaged.
Consequently, national laws bestow upon the courts the
power to facilitate interim relief, in accordance with party
autonomy.55 Therefore, this portrays delocalisation as
ineffective in practice as it is unable to resolve the issues
detailed above.
Procedural impropriety presents another circumstance
where judicial intervention is required. Fundamentally,
this takes place where the arbitrator(s) are biased in
support of one party as a result of being bribed.
Alternatively, this may exist where the tribunal falls short
of the required registration to be certified as an arbitral
tribunal.56 Consequently, if judicial intervention is not
made available in such situations, disputes cannot be
adequately settled, resulting in potential miscarriages of
justice. This is illustrated in the English case of Fiona
Trust.57Assistance was sought from the court with regard
to whether the arbitration clauses were wide enough to
include whether the contract that comprised the arbitral
clauses was obtained as a result of bribery.58Another issue
in Fiona Trust was in relation to the doctrine of
separability. This was with regard to whether it was the
tribunal or the court that possessed jurisdiction to
determine whether the parties should be obliged to
arbitrate. Essentially, this was a case where there existed
a contention that, in the absence of the bribery, the party
would have failed to be a participant in the contract.59 The
court adopted a different approach from previous case
law with regard to the issue surrounding the arbitral
clauses.60 It expressed that the clauses should be liberally
construed, an approach that was echoed inPremiumNafta
Products Ltd.61
Fiona Trust illustrates the vital function of the court
in the above-mentioned circumstances.While delocalised
arbitration is an appealing phenomenon which upholds
party autonomy, it cannot be ignored that such a concept
does not sufficiently manage matters such as the above.
Nevertheless, parties are free to arbitrate once the court
has supplied clarification with regard to the matter. Thus,
this indicates that judicial interference and delocalisation
can, to a certain degree, work together to achieve a more
desirable process of arbitration.
Furthermore, judicial review is supported by the
challenges posed by the doctrine of separability and the
principle of competence–competence. The contract and
the arbitration agreement are regarded as two separate
documents under the doctrine of separability, which
ensures that the arbitration agreement survives the main
47Lew, “Does National Court Involvement Undermine the International Arbitration Process?” (2009) 24 American University International Law Review 489, 496.
48NYC art.(2)(3); and UNCITRAL Model Law art.8.
49English Arbitration Act 1996 s.18 and UNCITRAL Model Law art.11.
50Dalimpex Ltd v Janicki (2003) CanLII 34234 (see Henri C. Alvarez et al.,Model Law Decisions: Cases Applying the UNCITRALModel Law on International Commercial
Arbitration (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2003), p.65).
51National Iran Oil Co v State of Israel (1967) 35 I.L.R. 136.
52Cangene Corp v Octapharm AG (2000) 9 W.W.R. 606.
53 J.D.M. Lew et al., Comparative International Commercial Arbitration (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2003).
54D. Sutton and J. Gill (eds), Russell on Arbitration, 23rd edn (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2007), paras 7.005–7.097.
55Dike, “Delocalisation of Ad Hoc Arbitral Proceedings” [2008] C.A.R. 1, 4.
56Li, “The Application of the Delocalisation Theory in Current International Commercial Arbitration” [2011] I.C.C.L.R. 1, 7.
57Fiona Trust & Holding Corp v Privalov [2007] EWCA Civ 20; [2007] 1 All E.R. (Comm) 891; [2007] Bus. L.R. 686.
58Fiona Trust [2007] EWCA Civ 20.
59D.A.R. Williams, “Defining the Role of the Court in Modern International Commercial Arbitration” (2014) 10 Asian International Arbitration Journal 137.
60 Previous case law had attempted to depict the differences between alternatively expressed clauses.
61Premium Nafta Products Ltd v Fili Shipping Co Ltd [2007] UKHL 40; [2007] 4 All E.R. 951; [2007] Bus. L.R. 1719.
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contract under which the agreement is contained. This is
vital, especially where issues arise regarding the
enforceability of the main contract.62 The separability
doctrine emanated from Harbour Assurance,63 which
consequently led to its being incorporated into the English
Arbitration Act 1996 under s.7.64 The court held that
arbitration clauses could only be regarded as void where
one party refuted the argument that an agreement to
arbitrate had been assumed, or where there was an error
with regard to the identity of the opposing contracting
party.65 An assertion of illegality was considered as
inadequate to regard the main agreement and the
arbitration agreement as void. This was advanced in the
Gosset66 case, where the French Cour de Cassation
established that invalid contracts do not impinge on the
concept of separability, and therefore the arbitration
agreement continues to be valid. Once again, the SNE v
Joc Oil67 case shed light on the application of the
separability doctrine. Despite the main agreement being
invalid as a consequence of SNE’s failure to provide
appropriate signature, the arbitration agreement was not
affected, and accordingly it was observed that it was
correct for the arbitral tribunal to assume jurisdiction.
This was further recognised and endorsed in Dalmia
Dairy Industries,68 where it was acknowledged by the
court that, under the International Chamber of Commerce
rules, arbitrators were granted authority to determine their
own jurisdiction. Again in SNE v Joc Oil, as a
consequence of the competence–competence principle,
the arbitral tribunal was able to assume jurisdiction. This
verdict was given recognition by the court and,
consequently, the award was enforced.69
The “competence–competence” principle which is
enshrined under art.16 of the UNCITRAL Model Law70
authorises arbitration tribunals to rule on their
jurisdiction.71 The principle is further endorsed by the
separability doctrine, which confirms that an arbitration
clause is independent of the commercial contract, enabling
the clause and jurisdiction to survive any termination or
invalidity of the contract.72 The competence–competence
principle provides that in circumstances where there is
uncertainty with regard to the validity or extent of the
arbitration agreement, the tribunal is granted authority to
rule on its jurisdiction. This capacity originates from
relevant national law, as opposed to the disputed arbitral
agreement, as the tribunal is granted the power to declare
that the agreement is void without conflicting itself. As
the tribunal is bestowed with such power, there is no
necessity for the parties or the tribunal to request national
courts to intervene and resolve jurisdictional issues.73
Furthermore, as a consequence of this principle,
arbitrators may be requested to determine their own
competence in order to resolve disputes, which is often
viewed as controversial. While it is true that the
jurisdiction of a tribunal may be contested as a
premeditated ploy by one party, there are, however, many
instances where there are serious concerns regarding a
tribunal’s jurisdiction to resolve a particular dispute.74
Consequently, jurisdictional challenge is a conferred right
of the parties and can be partial or total.
Moving on, the “positive effect” of the separability
doctrine enables arbitrators to continue proceeding with
arbitration despite challenges to the validity of the
agreement.75Consequently, this positive effect along with
the arbitrators’ innate power to rule on their jurisdiction
should compel the courts to restrict their review to a prima
facie determination that the agreement is not “null and
void, inoperative or incapable of being performed”.76 This
is acknowledged as the “negative effect” of
competence–competence and provides that arbitrators are
the first but not the only judges of their jurisdiction. As
such, national courts that are presented with issues
regarding the legality of the arbitration agreement are
obliged to abstain from conducting any hearings
concerning the authority of the arbitrators until the latter
have had the chance to do so. Thus, this priority afforded
to arbitrators is in harmony with NYC art.II(3) and does
not propose that national courts renounce their ability to
reconsider the legality of the arbitral agreement.
However, while the power bestowed upon arbitrators
is protected, it is nevertheless a cause for concern,
especially where there are issues regarding the integrity
of arbitrators. Here, court intervention is necessary, as
permitting the courts to intervene after the final award
has been decided may cause further issues. This indicates
that delocalisation is inadequate in dealing with such
situations and that judicial intervention is required, as
there would simply be no justice if the courts did not
62 James Carter and Hannah Kennedy, “English High Court Addresses Separability of Arbitration Clauses”, International Arbitration Newsletter, 26 June 2013. Available
at: https://www.dlapiper.com/en/uk/insights/publications/2013/06/english-high-court-addresses-separability-of-arb__/#_ftn3 [Accessed 30 May 2016].
63Harbour Assurance Co (UK) Ltd v Kansa General International Insurance Co Ltd [1993] Q.B. 701; [1993] 2 W.L.R. 42; [1993] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 455 CA (Civ Div).
64Arbitration Act 1996 s.7.
65Harbour Assurance [1993] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 455.
66Gosset case, Cour de Cassation, Ire Chamber [1963].
67 Sojuznefteexport (SNE) v Joc Oil Ltd [1990] XV Y.B.C.A. 31.
68Dalmia Dairy Industries v National Bank of Pakistan [1978] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 223; (1977) 121 S.J. 442 CA (Civ Div).
69 SNE v Joc Oil [1990] XV Yearbook Commercial Arbitration 31.
70UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration 1985, with amendments as adopted in 2006, art.16.
71 Julian D.M. Lew, “Achieving the Dream: Autonomous Arbitration” (2006) 22(2) Arbitration International Law 179, 193.
72Amokura Kawharu, “Arbitral Jurisdiction” (2008) 23 New Zealand Universities Law Review 238.
73Kawharu, “Arbitral Jurisdiction” (2008) 23 New Zealand Universities Law Review 238, 240.
74Aiste Sklenyte, “International Arbitration: The Doctrine of Separability and Competence-Competence Principle” [2003] Arhus School of Business 25.
75Obinna Dike, “Delocalisation of Ad Hoc Arbitral Proceedings”, p.6. Available at: http://www.dundee.ac.uk/cepmlp/gateway/files.php?file=cepmlp_car13_2_230684919
[Accessed 30 May 2016].
76Emmanuel Gaillard and Yas Banifatemi, “Negative Effect of Competence-Competence: The Rule of Priority in Favour of the Arbitrators” in Emmanuel Gaillard and
Domenico di Pietro (eds), Enforcement of Arbitration Agreements and International Arbitral Awards: The New York Convention in Practice (London: Cameron May Ltd,
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intervene. Furthermore, once an arbitral award has been
afforded, the arbitral tribunal no longer exists. The award
must be recognised and enforced and this can only be
conducted by national courts.77 Consequently, the court
of the place where the award is to be enforced along with
the legal systems of the place must be utilised in order to
ensure the victorious party is given their due. As such, it
is evident that the courts play a very integral role in the
arbitral process and this clearly indicates that “delocalised
arbitration” is simply theoretical in nature and in
practice.78
A middle ground
The solution is to find a middle ground, where
delocalisation and court oversight can coexist in harmony.
Hence, Paulsson rationalises that
“the question is rather whether in certain situations
… arbitration may be liberated from the local
peculiarities of a place of arbitration … having
nothing to do with the parties’ attachment to local
rules of arbitration”.79
Furthermore, Bucher, despite being a critic of
delocalisation, understood the legitimacy of Paulsson’s
argument. However, he proposed that the objective behind
delocalised arbitration could be accomplished by
connecting arbitration to a jurisdiction where the arbitral
award could not be disputed or where the parties have
the ability to enforce an agreement that would ensure
there was no challenge to the award.80 Li advocates this
as the “true meaning of delocalisation and … also the
method suggested by the theory to realistically achieve
delocalised arbitration”.81
Furthermore, academics such as Greenberg and
Weermantry suggest that, in the absence of pure
delocalisation, a diluted version of the concept exists.82
Here, national legal systems and courts have conceded
to legislative and practitioner demands to assume a
relaxed stance to arbitral procedures occurring within
their territories. Ultimately, this makes sense as the core
of arbitration is the autonomy of the parties. However,
as has been established, in certain circumstances judicial
intervention is required. Thus, rather than completely
separating the twowith very little success, it may be better
to acknowledge that they can both work together to an
extent. Nevertheless, where does this leave the principle
of party autonomy? If the autonomy of the parties is being
impinged upon, how can this be upholding their freedom?
While it is true that anything less than pure delocalisation
imposes upon party autonomy, from the above
examination it is evident that such cannot exist. Judicial
assistance is required. Thus, it makes sense to have a
diluted version of delocalisation. However, it is not
beneficial to simply concede to this without giving some
thought to possible reforms. As such, suggestions are
made with regard to what can be modified and, further,
what can be introduced to ensure that the core fabric of
arbitration, the principle of party autonomy, is maintained.
The way forward
While it was acknowledged that delocalisation proposed
to safeguard the arbitral process from judicial interference,
it nevertheless fell short of adequately dealing with certain
issues. These included procedural improprieties in the
arbitral process, among others.83 Thus, in many
circumstances, national courts were required to intervene,
which was regarded as saving the arbitral process.84
Consequently, this highlights a potential area for reform,
enabling a purer form of delocalisation.
Arbitral tribunals lose their jurisdiction once an award
has been rendered. Thus, enforcing the award and
instances where parties wish to set it aside for procedural
irregularities means that they must seek assistance from
national courts. Nevertheless, there is great discrepancy
involved. For instance, the parties select arbitration to
resolve their dispute. As such, this process should not
conclude once an award has been rendered. Rather, the
arbitral process should also accommodate the need of the
parties to enforce or challenge the award, without
offloading them on to the national courts. Effectively,
this would increase the benefits of arbitration.
As a solution, rather than parties depending on national
courts in instances where there are procedural
improprieties—challenging the arbitral award and other
issues—a separate appeals chamber can be created to deal
with such matters. This would be similar to the ICSID
Additional Facility, which as an appeals chamber provides
arbitration, conciliation and fact-finding services. These
are for certain disputes that do not fall within the remit
of the ICSID Convention.85 Furthermore, there would be
no need for another international treaty in creating this
chamber. The NYC can circumvent requirements for an
international treaty by including a provision that all
decisions made by the chamber must be recognised by
contracting states. This would enable efficiency and
certainty in the recognition and implementation of the
chamber’s decisions.
As a result, the appeals chamber would be independent
from the arbitral tribunal to ensure there is no conflict of
interest. Trained professionals would be appointed,
77Li, “The Application of the Delocalisation Theory in Current International Commercial Arbitration” [2011] I.C.C.L.R. 1, 9.
78Dike, “Delocalisation of Ad Hoc Arbitral Proceedings”, p.14.
79 Jan Paulsson, “Delocalisation of International Commercial Arbitration: When and Why It Matters” (1983) 32 International & Comparative Law Quarterly 53, 54.
80 Paulsson, “Delocalisation of International Commercial Arbitration” (1983) 32 International & Comparative Law Quarterly 53, 54.
81Li, “The Application of the Delocalisation Theory in Current International Commercial Arbitration” [2011] I.C.C.L.R. 1, 4.
82 S. Greenberg, C. Kee and J.R. Weermantry, International Commercial Arbitration: An Asia-Pacific Perspective (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), p.79.
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84Lew, “Does National Court Involvement Undermine the International Arbitration Process?” (2009) 24 American University International Law Review 489, 496.
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determining the issues in an unbiasedmanner. This would
ensure that such professionals are of the same calibre and
possess equal competence as national judges without
actually being judges. Essentially, this enables the same
quality of service as courts provide but without there
being any judicial intervention. Furthermore, these appeal
chambers can be created for each arbitral institution, as
each institution has its own rules. Consequently, this
would enable parties’ easy access, if and when issues
arise before, during or after the arbitral process.
However, while appeal chambers would be an ideal
solution by enabling delocalisation to exist in its purest
form, many issues remain. First, creating a new appeals
chamber for each arbitral institution would cost a lot of
time and money. Where will these funds be generated
from? Who will oversee the creation of these chambers?
In addition, while it may be easier and perhaps cheaper
to have one chamber per contracting state, this would
create unnecessary backlogs. Also, this would not be
welcomed, as a key benefit of arbitration is its speed. In
addition, each arbitral institute has its own rules, so it
would not make sense for one appeal chamber in each
state to be able to adequately deal with all appeals under
one set of rules. Problems also exist in relation to the
appointment of the professionals.Who will appoint them
and how will they be selected? Will the parties select
them as they choose arbitrators, or will they be appointed
with no regard to the parties’ choice? As such, does this
not impede party autonomy? Furthermore, issues also
arise with regard to modifying the NYC to include the
provision of appeal chambers. It is difficult to amend the
NYC with the requisite approval and the practical
difficulties presented by ratification by existing
members.86
In addition, if the arbitral process is completely
independent of the national courts and legal systems, then
who will regulate the process? Although the chambers
can take on a regulatory function, they are ultimately a
branch of the tribunals, however independent they may
be. Thus, if there is any bias by the appointed
professionals in deciding matters, how will this be
resolved? While it can be argued that judges in national
courts can also be biased when resolving issues, the fact
that they have been in existence and have successfully
resolved a vast number of cases indicates their
effectiveness. Therefore, creating new appeal chambers
in light of an already established judicial system,
removing their power to intervene and granting it to
another institute is not feasible.
These challenges offer support to the anti-delocalisation
campaign that legal principles should not exist in a
vacuum. It is problematic for an arbitral process to be
completely detached from the laws of the seat of
arbitration. As such, arbitral proceedings that arise as a
result of private contractual stipulations should possess
a national disposition.87 This then brings the debate back
to the idea of a diluted version of delocalisation, which
is more practical than keeping the arbitral process
completely independent of national legal systems. In this
form, national laws and courts have taken a step back
from legislative and/or practitioner demands. Instead they
have adopted a more laid-back attitude to arbitrations
held within their jurisdictions.88
Consequently, the impact of an almost delocalised
arbitration is that it can be exercised in certain
jurisdictions, if the legal system and courts of that state
allow it. However, although the ICSIDAdditional Facility
is a separate appeals chamber, judicial intervention still
occurs.89 As such, this creates concerns for the proposed
chamber. If its purpose is to curb judicial intervention
and to ensure the purest form of delocalisation, perhaps
it is safe to state that this would not be the case. This is
because of the experience the ICSID Additional Facility
has had with judicial intervention. Thus, it is likely that
the proposed chambers will have the same experience.
As a result, it is concluded that it may not be practical for
pure delocalisation to exist in the context as suggested
above. Therefore, it is more useful to enable arbitration
to co-exist with the courts and legal systems to take a
hands-off approach, as opposed to excessive interference.
The suggested reforms with regard to delocalisation
have been examined. While an independent appeals
chamber would be the best solution to ensure that
delocalisation can purely exist, without excessive judicial
intervention, it simply is not feasible. This is because, in
practice, issues still exist which impede party autonomy.
Having an absolute system of arbitration, free from the
vestiges of national law, sits well on paper but has no
practical significance. Thus it is proposed that as a diluted
version of delocalisation currently exists, it should
continue to be supported to ensure amore effective system
of arbitration.
Conclusion
In conclusion, after critically exploring the case for a
diluted version of delocalisation in international
commercial arbitration, it is evident that delocalisation
is a highly attractive concept. Essentially, it endeavours
to enable the arbitration process to be free from the
vestiges of national laws evidenced through the
supervision of the arbitral process. While this may be
achievable, judicial intervention is also an integral part
of the arbitral process and cannot be ignored. Arbitral
proceedings are often subject to many issues which
require the assistance of national courts. This supportive
function is extremely crucial, as courts can utilise their
powers to ensure a successful hearing and the enforcement
86A.J. van den Berg, “Q & A with Albert Jan van den Berg” (2008) 3 Global Arbitration Review 21.
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Law” [2010] Contemporary Issues in International Arbitration and Mediation 71.
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of the arbitral awards—powers which the arbitral tribunals
lack. Furthermore, courts and national legal systems are
vital in enforcing awards as the tribunals no longer exist
once awards have been granted.
Therefore, it was proposed that, owing to the many
circumstances where judicial intervention is necessitated
in the arbitral process, it may be beneficial to create a
separate appeals chamber. This would deal with issues
for which the parties currently seek court assistance. For
instance, where the parties wish to enforce the award or
challenge it, the parties can request help from the chamber
instead of the court. Ultimately, this would limit judicial
intervention and uphold the theory of delocalisation and
party autonomy. Consequently, it was proposed that the
NYC should be amended to include the provision of this
new chamber and that all its decisions should be binding
on contracting states.
However, while a separate appeals chamber would be
ideal, it simply would not be practical, owing to issues
such as costs and regulatory functions. Also, modifying
the NYC would be very difficult. Furthermore, having
an arbitral process that is completely independent and
existing in a legal vacuum does no favours. Often it pays
to have judicial intervention, although this is contrary to
delocalisation and to the core features of arbitration. This
is because case law illustrates a working system, a process
that “saves the arbitral tribunal”. Therefore, if judicial
intervention means that the arbitral process remains a
functioning and subsisting dispute resolutionmechanism,
then is it so bad that interference from the courts exist?
On the other hand, of course it matters. Party autonomy
is the core feature of arbitration. As the parties have
selected to arbitrate over litigation, the continuing
intervention of the courts is not always welcome.
Nevertheless, it was proposed that as a diluted version of
delocalisation may already exist, it would be more
reasonable to support it. This would be practical and
would enable a more effective system of arbitration, as
opposed to having a completely independent arbitral
system or one with excessive judicial intervention.
In the future, thought must also be given to the way
forward. It has been argued that a separate appeals
chamber may not be the best solution to limit the
restrictions on party autonomy. Therefore, perhaps
actively implementing a diluted form of delocalisation
across all contracting states is a step in the right direction.
Courts and legal systems taking a more relaxed approach
to arbitration may assist in limiting judicial intervention,
which will enable both delocalisation and party autonomy
to be upheld.
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